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Why do some Chinese technology firms
avoid ChiNext and go public in the US?∗
Ufuk Gu¨c¸bilmez†
February 19, 2014
Abstract
Some Chinese technology firms prefer to go public on US exchanges despite the launch of
ChiNext as a NASDAQ-style board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in late 2009. Con-
ventional hypotheses based on sales internationalization and issuing costs fail to explain
this preference. Instead, our findings suggest the existence of a separating equilibrium in
which small but profitable firms choose ChiNext and large firms backed by foreign venture
capital prefer US exchanges as their IPO location. Our findings have broader implications
for entrepreneurial finance in China. Policy suggestions are offered for increasing the
number of foreign VC-backed IPOs on ChiNext.
JEL classification: G15, G24, G32
Keywords: IPO, venture capital, China
1 Introduction
ChiNext is a new board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) launched in October 2009.
According to the SZSE, the purpose of ChiNext is ‘to promote the development of innovative
enterprises and other growing start-ups’.1 It is developed as a NASDAQ-style exchange for
∗The author thanks Douglas Cumming, Jo Danbolt, Zhenyu Wu, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful
comments and suggestions. The research assistance of Yang Bai and To´mas O´ Briain are greatly appreciated.
All remaining errors are the responsibility of the author.
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1http://www.szse.cn/main/en/ListingatSZSE/ListingQA/
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the shares of Chinese technology firms. Since its launch, more than 300 firms have gone public
on ChiNext, raising more than $31.5 billion in total. To put these figures into perspective,
over the same period, 184 firms went public on NASDAQ raising $24.1 billion.
ChiNext has been a long time coming. Initial plans to set it up were announced during the
NASDAQ Bubble period, but were shelved after the bubble burst. The main driver behind
ChiNext’s launch has been the growth of the venture capital (VC) industry in China. A
new board similar to NASDAQ was seen as essential to further the industry’s development,
since the strict listing requirements of the main boards in Shanghai and Shenzhen made it
very difficult for VC firms to exit their investment via an initial public offering (IPO) (White
et al., 2005). A first step was taken in 2004 when the SZSE launched the Small and Medium
Enterprise (SME) board. However, the board failed to meet the needs of the VC industry,
since the listing requirements were still too stringent for the majority of entrepreneurial firms
to be eligible for listing. According to Tan et al. (2013), only approximately 20% of firms that
went public on the SME Board between May 2004 (the market’s inception) and December
2008 had venture capital backing.
ChiNext finally emerged in late 2009 with relatively looser listing requirements than the
SME board. For instance, a firm cannot go public on the SME Board if its intangible as-
sets represent more than 20% of net assets. ChiNext places no such restriction on issuers.
Moreover, the SME Board requires issuers to be profitable during the three years before an
IPO with a minimum aggregate net profit of RMB 30 million, whereas a firm is eligible to
go public on ChiNext if it was profitable during the two years previous to an IPO with a
minimum aggregate net profit of RMB 10 million.2
NASDAQ has built up its reputation as a top exchange for technology stocks and has
attracted the IPOs of Chinese high-tech firms.3 An IPO on NASDAQ or the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) can be a lucrative exit for the founders of a firm and the venture capitalists
2For a comprehensive list of the listing requirements of the SME Board and ChiNext see
http://www.szse.cn/main/en/ListingatSZSE/ListingRequirements/.
3Examples include Actions Semiconductor Co Ltd (IPO year: 2005), Baidu Inc (2005), China GrenTech
Corporation Limited (2006), China Medical Technologies Inc (2005), China Sunergy Co Ltd (2007), Ctrip.com
International Ltd (2003), JA Solar Holdings Co Ltd (2007), Shanda Interactive Entertainment Limited (2004),
Spreadtrum Communications Inc (2007), and Vimicro International Corporation (2005).
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who backed the firm. Data from the Securities Data Company (SDC) shows that more than
60 Chinese firms went public on NASDAQ or the NYSE and raised an aggregate amount of
11.2 billion U.S dollars (measured in 2012 prices) within the five year period that preceded
the launch of ChiNext. Approximately half of these firms were in a high-tech industry, and
around 65% of the high-tech issuers were VC-backed.
In China, both regulators and the VC industry expected ChiNext to fulfil the role of
NASDAQ. However, contrary to expectations, the launch of ChiNext did not put an end to
the era of IPOs by Chinese technology firms on NASDAQ and the NYSE. Chinese technology
firms have continued to go public in the US. The primary purpose of this paper is to address
the following research question. Why do some Chinese technology firms not take up the
option of going public on ChiNext and conduct an IPO in the US instead? The answer is
far from obvious, since ChiNext, a domestic exchange designed to attract entrepreneurial
high-tech firms, is the natural IPO location for such firms. Furthermore, the question has
broader implications for entrepreneurial finance in China. According to Black and Gilson
(1998, p. 245), a vibrant VC industry requires a ‘well developed stock market that permits
venture capitalists to exit through an initial public offering (IPO).’ In the past, Chinese equity
markets have struggled to offer entrepreneurial high-tech firms a market for their IPOs, and
some of these firms still prefer a foreign IPO despite the launch of ChiNext. Therefore, it is
important to investigate why ChiNext is not attractive for all Chinese technology firms, since
this investigation contributes to our understanding of the issues faced by entrepreneurial firms
and the VC industry in China.
We put forward three main hypotheses that have have the potential to answer our research
question. These three hypotheses are based on (i) product market considerations, (ii) issuing
costs, and (iii) foreign VC backing. According to the first hypothesis, firms are more likely
to engage in a foreign listing when a larger fraction of their total sales is generated abroad
(Saudagaran, 1988, Saudagaran and Biddle, 1995, and Mittoo, 1992), or when their strategy
is to expand their foreign sales with the visibility brought by the foreign listing (Pagano
et al., 2002, Bancel and Mittoo, 2001). We use hand-collected data to examine geographical
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segments of sales up to three years before and two years after an IPO and find no convincing
evidence that these considerations cause Chinese technology firms to go public in the US.
Chinese technology firms that choose to conduct an IPO in the US mainly operate in China
before and after their issues.
The second hypothesis is motivated by the fact that average underpricing is much higher in
China compared to the US. Reported figures commonly exceed 100% in China. For instance,
Tan et al. (2013), whose sample includes the IPOs on the SME Board between May 2004 and
December 2008, report an average underpricing of 160% and 125% for VC-backed and non-
VC-backed IPOs respectively. Similarly high estimates are reported in Lin and Tian (2012),
Tian (2011), and Chan et al. (2004). Average underpricing is considerably lower in the US
at around 15-20% (Loughran and Ritter, 2004, Ljungqvist, 2007). The latest statistics on
Jay Ritter’s homepage show that the average first-day return in the US market between 1980
and 2012 is 17.9%.4 If a firm believes that it will leave a substantial amount of money on
the table by going public on ChiNext, it might prefer to conduct an IPO in the US instead.
Indeed, we find that average underpricing is lower for Chinese technology firms that choose
NASDAQ/NYSE over ChiNext as their IPO destination. However, when we match firms on
the basis of their pre-IPO characteristics, no significant difference remains. We conduct a
similar exercise in terms of gross spread and document that Chinese technology firms that go
public on ChiNext actually pay a lower gross spread than comparable firms that go public
in the US. The results concerning underpricing and gross spread remain robust when the
potential endogeneity of the choice of going public in the US is addressed. Therefore, issuing
costs cannot be the reason why ChiNext is not attractive for some Chinese technology firms.
Recent research shows that foreign VCs are less likely to exit via an IPO inside China,
and an IPO outside China is more likely when there is foreign VC backing (Humphery-Jenner
and Suchard, 2013a, Humphery-Jenner and Suchard, 2013b). There are several reasons for
foreign VCs to avoid an IPO inside China. For instance, regulators can favor domestic VC-
backed firms during the IPO approval process (Zhang et al., 2007, Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003,
4http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/IPOs2012Underpricing.pdf
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and White et al., 2005) and foreign VCs lack the necessary political connections (Humphery-
Jenner and Suchard, 2013a). In order to test whether foreign VC backing is the main driver
behind a Chinese technology firm’s decision to go public in the US, we analyze the pre-IPO
financing sources of sample firms that went public in the US. We find that all but one of
these firms are backed by foreign VC firms. Over several financing rounds, the average firm
raises close to $80 million before going public. Furthermore, it is common for these firms to
sell shares owned by existing shareholders either during the IPO or by way of a follow-up
seasoned equity offering (SEO). This strengthens the argument that foreign VCs’ desire of a
successful exit drives Chinese technology firms to go public in the US. We also investigate IPO
prospectuses of Chinese firms that went public on ChiNext and find that only less than 7% of
the technology firms we examine have foreign VC backing. These findings suggest that IPOs
of Chinese technology firms that have foreign VC backing are clustered in the US. Therefore,
we conclude that foreign VC backing is a major factor that drives Chinese technology firms
to pursue an IPO outside China rather than on ChiNext.
Finally, we model a Chinese technology firm’s choice of going public on NASDAQ/NYSE
versus ChiNext. The literature suggests that firm size is likely to be a major determinant of
this choice (Saudagaran, 1988, Pagano et al., 2002). We hypothesize that profitability should
also be a significant determinant, since foreign VCs can prefer a timely IPO exit in the US
rather than an IPO on ChiNext that is delayed until the firm meets ChiNext’s profitability
requirements. Our results confirm these predictions, with both size and profitability being
significant determinants of the IPO location. In fact, we show that it is not difficult to predict
a Chinese technology firm’s IPO location on the basis of its pre-IPO characteristics, even
without knowing whether it has foreign VC backing or not. This implies a separating equilib-
rium in which Chinese technology firms that go public on ChiNext are small but profitable,
and those that conduct an IPO in the US tend to be large, not necessarily profitable, and
foreign VC backed.
The contribution of the present paper is twofold. As well as being the first in the lit-
erature to evaluate whether ChiNext, a new and fast-growing exchange, has been successful
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in its mission of attracting Chinese technology firms, our findings shed light on the broader
issue of IPO exits of entrepreneurial firms in China. The paper contributes by showing that
while ChiNext was launched with the expectation of facilitating IPO exits of entrepreneurial
technology firms, this expectation has been only partially realized to date. ChiNext has been
successful in attracting the IPOs of small technology firms that are profitable, but large and
foreign VC-backed firms still tend to prefer an IPO in the US, despite the fact that they mainly
operate in China. These findings are topical given the IPO hiatus in China that started in
late 2012 and the current debate regarding the IPO approval system enforced by Chinese reg-
ulators.5 Our findings imply that policy makers must focus on improving (i) the transparency
of the approval system, (ii) market liquidity, and (iii) listing requirements relating to firm
profitability to make ChiNext an attractive venue of exit for foreign VCs.
Secondly, the paper adds to the strands of literature on a firm’s decision to go public
abroad and American depositary receipt (ADR) issues by foreign firms in the US. According
to data provided in Gao et al. (forthcoming), between 2005 and 2009, ADRs accounted for 12%
of all IPOs in the US, and almost 75% of ADR issues were conducted by Chinese firms. Our
findings show that ADR IPOs of Chinese technology firms in the US are strongly motivated
by foreign VC backing rather than product market considerations and issuing costs. The
results are consistent with Hursti and Maula (2007) who study foreign IPOs conducted by
European firms and who find that pre-IPO ownership by foreign investors and high-tech
industry membership are major determinants of going public abroad (see also Blass and
Yafeh, 2001). Bruner et al. (2004) compare issuing costs (underwriting fees and underpricing)
across foreign and domestic IPOs conducted in the US and find that they are comparable. On
the other hand, Ejara and Ghosh (2004) find that ADR IPOs are significantly less underpriced
in comparison to matching US IPOs. However, these papers do not investigate whether it is
cheaper for a firm to go public abroad rather than at home. We match Chinese technology
firms that go public in the US with those on ChiNext and show that such firms cannot expect
5These topics are widely covered in the press. See e.g., ‘China’s IPO door indefinitely shut’ (Wall Street
Journal, US Edition, December 27, 2012, p. C2) and ‘China gets tough toward IPOs - As regulator thins the
waiting list, investors ask if it’s more than short-term fix’ (Wall Street Journal, Asia Edition, February 22,
2013, p. 15).
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to lower their (direct and indirect) issuing costs significantly by going public in the US.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The hypotheses are developed in Section 2.
In Section 3, we describe the data and perform empirical tests of the hypotheses developed in
the previous section. Finally, Section 4 concludes with a discussion of the policy implications
of our results.
2 Hypotheses
2.1 Theoretical background
There is a well-developed body of theoretical literature on why firms go public. The reasons
include owners’ desire for diversification and exit (Pa´stor et al., 2009, Zingales, 1995), raising
capital to invest in growth opportunities (Pa´stor and Veronesi, 2005), lowering cost of capital
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999), obtaining ownership dispersion to curb excessive mon-
itoring (Pagano and Ro¨ell, 1998), and preempting industry competitors (Chemmanur and
He, 2011). Furthermore, exploiting favorable market conditions (Pagano et al., 1998) and
using common stock as a currency for acquisitions (C¸elikyurt et al., 2010) are often cited as
motivations for an IPO.6
The theoretical literature on the decision to go public abroad is much more limited. In fact,
this decision is often not distinguished from that of cross-listing shares on a foreign exchange.
For instance, Pagano et al. (2002, p. 2653), who study foreign listings of companies, do not
separate firms that list shares on foreign exchanges as ‘their first port of entry into the public
equity market’ from those that enter a foreign exchange ‘after having already listed on their
domestic exchange’. However, Caglio et al. (2013) find that the determinants of the decision
to go public abroad are different from the determinants of the decision to cross-list shares on
an overseas exchange.
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006) and Stulz (2009) provide theories of going public abroad,
which are supported by empirical evidence in Caglio et al. (2013). Chemmanur and Fulghieri
6See Ritter and Welch (2002) and Bancel and Mittoo (2013) for a review of the theory and evidence on why
firms go public.
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argue that a firm is more likely to go public abroad if the investors that can value the firm
at a low cost are clustered in a foreign market. This theory offers a clear explanation of
why Chinese technology firms went public on NASDAQ or the NYSE prior to the launch
of ChiNext, but this explanation is less convincing now, since ChiNext is designed to be a
NASDAQ-style exchange that specifically targets technology firms. The model developed in
Stulz (2009) predicts that foreign IPOs will tend to originate from countries that have poor
disclosure standards. While this model provides a good reason why Chinese firms have a
higher propensity to go public abroad compared to firms from some other countries, it cannot
fully explain why ChiNext has been successful in attracting some Chinese technology firms
and not the others. There are some other theoretical arguments put forward in the prior
literature that can potentially explain this issue. In what follows, we discuss these arguments
in detail and develop testable hypotheses based on them.
2.2 Product market considerations
There is evidence in the literature that a firm is more likely to list shares outside its home
country if a significant fraction of its revenues is generated abroad. The idea is that such
a firm has a product market reputation in a foreign market and goes public in that market
to benefit from its established reputation. Saudagaran (1988) finds that foreign sales as a
fraction of total sales is higher for firms that list shares abroad. Saudagaran and Biddle
(1995) extend this line of research by showing that cross-listing firms tend to list their shares
in the country where the main part of their foreign sales derive from. There is also survey
evidence regarding the link between foreign sales and listing abroad. Mittoo (1992) conducts
a survey of Canadian firms that listed shares in the US and UK and observes that about half
of the respondent firms generate more than fifty percent of their sales in foreign markets.
Several other papers argue that firms may have a motivation to list shares abroad not
necessarily because the existing level of foreign sales is high, but because they aim to increase
the level of foreign sales. Bancel and Mittoo (2001) argue that firms may be strategically
seeking a foreign listing to expand their foreign operations. Similarly, Pagano et al. (2002)
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point out that listing shares abroad can serve as an advertisement for the firm’s product and
cause a shift in foreign sales.
In this context, it is possible that some Chinese technology firms prefer to go public on a
US stock exchange if they are either exporting their products to the US already (i.e., have an
established product market reputation), or aiming to increase their exports with the visibility
brought by their IPOs (i.e., building/extending product market reputation). These product
market considerations are formalized in the following two hypotheses:
H1a: A large fraction of the revenues generated by Chinese technology firms that
go public in the US is due to foreign sales.
H1b: Foreign sales grow significantly following the IPOs of Chinese technology
firms in the US.
2.3 Issuing costs
Positive initial returns in the IPO market is often interpreted as evidence of underpricing;
and Chinese IPO markets are characterized by extremely high initial returns, particularly
in 1990s when the pricing of IPO shares was heavily regulated. Chan et al. (2004) report
an average underpricing of 178% for A-share IPOs during the 1993–1998 period; Tian (2011)
estimates the average underpricing as 247% during the 1992–2004 period; Lin and Tian (2012)
document an average underpricing of 111% between 2001 and 2009; and Tan et al. (2013),
whose period covers between May 2004 and December 2008, report 160% and 125% for VC-
backed and non-VC-backed IPOs respectively. In comparison, Loughran and Ritter (2004)
find that the average initial return is 18.7% for US IPOs over the period between 1980 and
2003. According to the statistics provided by Jay Ritter, the average first-day return of US
IPOs between 1980 and 2012 is 17.9%.
Underpricing is an indirect cost of going public, since issuers ‘leave money on the table’
(Loughran and Ritter, 2002) by agreeing to an offer price well below the aftermarket price.
Given that the average underpricing is substantially lower in the US, Chinese firms that
believe they would suffer heavy underpricing if they went public on ChiNext might prefer
9
to go public on NASDAQ or the NYSE. Technology firms are particularly susceptible to
severe underpricing, since information asymmetry, an important determinant of underpricing
(see e.g., Beatty and Ritter (1986)), is more pronounced for such firms, hence the stronger
motivation for them to go public in the US.
H2a: Chinese technology firms that go public in the US experience less underpric-
ing than comparable firms that go public on ChiNext.
Two points have to be emphasized regarding this hypothesis. First, a lower average
underpricing in the US subsample of Chinese technology IPOs is not sufficient evidence for
H2a. The difference in average underpricing could be due to a difference in average firm
quality that can be caused by the difference in the listing standards between US and ChiNext
(Johan, 2010), or the differential level of enforcement on cases of fraud (Cumming and Johan,
2013). In other words, if listing standards and law enforcement act as screening devices,
the quality of a Chinese technology firm that goes public in the US rather than on ChiNext
will be on average higher, and its underpricing will be on average lower. What H2a states
is different. It argues that a firm chooses to go public in the US if it believes that its IPO
will be underpriced less than an IPO on ChiNext conducted by a firm of comparable (not
average) quality. Secondly, if this hypothesis is supported a new question is raised: If issues
are significantly less underpriced in the US and issuers care about underpricing, why are all
Chinese technology firms not going public there? A potential explanation for this question
may be based on the motivations of H1a. Suppose that two Chinese technology firms are very
similar to each other except that one has already built up product market reputation in the
US. It will be easier for that firm to conduct an IPO in the US, since US investors are already
familiar with the firm. On the other hand, the firm that is unknown in the US might find it
more difficult to go public there despite being attracted to the prospect of lower underpricing.
Underpricing is not the only cost associated with going public. There are direct costs
of going public as well. The direct costs are quite substantial and add up to 11% of the
gross proceeds on average in the US (Lee et al., 1996). Gross spread, or underwriter fees, is
the main component of direct costs and it is very often set exactly equal to 7% in the US
10
(Chen and Ritter, 2000). Given that ChiNext is a new market, there is more uncertainty
about the success of an IPO. Therefore, underwriters who put their reputation at stake when
taking firms public (Beatty and Ritter, 1986) can demand a higher percentage gross spread
as compensation for the higher risk they are taking on. Furthermore, it is possible that
the underwriters command a strong bargaining power until ChiNext becomes a fully mature
and competitive IPO market. If this is the case, they can use their power to set the gross
spread higher. Both the risk and the bargaining power based considerations imply a higher
percentage gross spread, which might deter some firms from going public on ChiNext and give
them an incentive to go public in the US if the gross spread there is lower.
H2b: Chinese technology firms that go public in the US pay a lower percentage
gross spread than comparable firms that go public on ChiNext.
2.4 Foreign VC backing
The venture capital industry in China has been growing steadily during the past decade in
parallel with the development of Chinese equity markets. According to Humphery-Jenner and
Suchard (2013b), VC investment in China has risen to $31.4 billion in 2010 from $1.2 billion
in 1999. While in its early years the industry was led by domestic VC firms, foreign VC firms
have started to play an increasing role since early 2000s (Zhang et al., 2007).
A key element of the venture capital cycle is the investment exit (Gompers and Lerner,
2001). The exit not only allows partners of a VC firm to realize a return on their investment,
but also recycles funds for new investments. An initial public offering is the preferred mode
of exit for successful VC-backed investments in the US. However, the actual exit has always
been a challenge for VC firms doing business in China. In what follows we examine the issues
that make an IPO exit in China harder for VC firms. Some of these issues affect foreign VCs
only, whereas others have an impact on domestic as well as foreign VCs. Since foreign VCs
are in a better position to help their firms complete an IPO aboard, we mainly refer to them
in the discussion.7
7Humphery-Jenner and Suchard (2013a, p. 608) explain that ‘foreign VCs are typically larger, better
connected with key intermediaries, more experienced, and more knowledgeable than are domestic VCs about
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Once a firm applies to go public in China, it is added to a waiting list for IPO approval
by the China Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The waiting period is reported
to be anything between six months and a couple of years. Zhang et al. (2007) note that
politics is involved in the approval decision, such that foreign VCs believe that firms backed
by domestic VCs are favored in the process. Bruton and Ahlstrom (2003, p. 249) argue that
firms backed by international capital are in a less favorable position for a domestic listing,
and they should ‘look to either strategic buyers or a listing on a foreign exchange such as
the NASDAQ.’ In a similar vein, several papers argue that foreign VCs are less likely to have
the political connections (or ‘guangxi’) that will increase the likelihood of IPO approval (see
e.g., Humphery-Jenner and Suchard, 2013b). Finally, White et al. (2005, p. 910) mention
that: ‘As in other areas, the government is also concerned about foreign dominance, and will
continue to do what it considers to be supportive of local venture capital firms vis-a`-vis foreign
firms.’
A long lock-up period is a further impediment to an IPO exit in China. The rules of listing
shares on ChiNext state that shares issued before the IPO are not transferable for a period
of one year after the listing. Furthermore, the pre-IPO shares of controlling shareholders are
subject to a lockup period of 36 months.8 The lock-up period is typically 180 days in the
US (see e.g., Bradley et al., 2001). Therefore, a foreign VC firm that has backed a Chinese
technology firm bears a longer lock-up period before exit, if the firm goes public on ChiNext
rather than NASDAQ/NYSE.
An additional challenge for foreign VCs that make an investment exit in China is the
repatriation of profits. Zhang et al. (2007) claim that the problems associated with the
convertibility of yuan incentivize foreign VCs to prefer investing in Chinese firms that have
the potential of listing overseas in the first place.
Listing requirements impose a barrier to an IPO exit in China too. ChiNext is launched
as a NASDAQ-style exchange primarily to provide innovative growth firms access to capital
markets. In this respect, the requirements for listing shares on ChiNext are less stringent than
international (developed) markets.’
812 months after the IPO, controlling shareholders can apply to the CSRC for an exemption.
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those of the SME Board of the SZSE. For instance, the SME board requires profitability in the
past three years, with net profits of at least RMB 30 million in aggregate, whereas ChiNext
requires profitability in the past two years, with either net profits of at least RMB 10 million
in aggregate, or minimum net profits of RMB 5 million and revenue of RMB 50 million in the
past year, plus a revenue growth of 30% for either of the past two years. However, technology
firms can still be unprofitable at the time when VCs desire an exit. For instance, Jain et al.
(2008) point out an increase in the number of firms that go public before reaching profitability
and argue that this increase is mainly driven by technology firms. Darrough et al. (2012) argue
that failure to meet the profitability requirements is one of the main reasons why a Chinese
firm’s IPO application can be rejected by the CSRC. Compared to ChiNext, NASDAQ offers
a lot more flexibility in terms of listing requirements. It not only contains three different tiers
(Global Select Market, Global Market, and Capital Market) for different sizes of firms, but
also in each tier it is sufficient for a firm to satisfy one (out of a few) set of listing standards.9
Therefore, foreign VC-backed Chinese technology firms that have the prospect of profitability,
but that do not satisfy the profitability requirements of ChiNext, have to go public abroad,
unless they can afford to wait until they become profitable.
The issues on legality are also likely to motivate foreign VCs to prefer an IPO outside
China. Cumming et al. (2006) find that IPO exits by VC-backed firms are more likely to
occur in countries with a higher quality of legal system. Zhang et al. (2007) note that foreign
VCs that invest in Chinese firms prefer ‘offshore domiciling’ in countries where the legal
jurisdiction is more predictable.
Finally, Chinese equity markets do not rank highly in terms of the quality of their trading
rules and liquidity. Cumming et al. (2011) provide rankings of stock exchanges in terms of
trading rules. The Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges perform worse than NASDAQ
and NYSE with regard to price manipulation, market manipulation, and insider trading
rules. Cumming et al. find that detailed trading rules improve liquidity. Especially, price
manipulation and insider trading rules have positive impacts on volatility and bid-ask spreads
9The information is obtained from the Initial Listing Guide, which is downloaded from
https://listingcenter.nasdaqomx.com/Home.aspx.
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respectively. Clearly, VCs would prefer an exit from their investments in a liquid market. As
a result, foreign VCs might find an IPO on a liquid US exchange more attractive than on
ChiNext.
To sum up, the discussion above provides several reasons why foreign VC-backed tech-
nology firms might prefer to avoid an IPO on ChiNext: (i) long queues for going public, (ii)
political bias in IPO approvals, (ii) long lock-up periods, (iii) issues with the repatriation of
profits, (iv) strict restrictions on profitability, (v) lower quality of the legal system, (vi) under-
developed trading rules and issues with liquidity. Therefore, we hypothesize that a Chinese
technology firm’s decision to go public in the US will depend on whether or not the firm is
backed by a foreign VC firm.
H3a: Foreign venture capital backing is a major determinant of a Chinese tech-
nology firm’s decision to go public in the US, rather than on ChiNext.
We should emphasize that foreign VC backing per se does not cause Chinese technology firms
to go public in the US. Instead, the underlying reasons itemized above cause foreign VCs that
desire a successful exit to select the firms that have the potential to go public in the US and
to put an effort in helping such firms conduct an IPO on NASDAQ/NYSE.
H3a can be tested directly by examining whether the Chinese technology firms that go
public in the US are backed by foreign VCs or not. Furthermore, if Chinese technology firms
are going public in the US to provide foreign VCs and other owners with a successful exit, it is
likely that the IPOs of these firms will feature secondary shares offered by existing shareholders
and/or the firms will sell secondary shares in an SEO soon after their IPOs. Moreover, we
anticipate that at least some of these firms will not meet the listing requirements of ChiNext,
particularly those regarding profitability. In general, we expect that the average profitability
will be lower for the firms that go public in the US, since they do not have to be profitable
at the time of their IPOs, whereas those that go public on ChiNext do.
H3b: There is a negative relationship between profitability and going public in
the US rather than on ChiNext.
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Furthermore, the literature documents that larger firms are more likely to list shares abroad
(Saudagaran, 1988, Pagano et al., 2002). If, as argued by Zhang et al. (2007), foreign VCs
target Chinese firms that have the potential to go public abroad, we expect the target firms
to be large, since smaller firms might not be able to undertake the onerous task of conducting
an IPO in the US.
H3c: There is a positive relationship between size and going public in the US
rather than on ChiNext.
In summary, based on the evidence offered by the literature, we hypothesize that foreign
sales, issuing costs (underpricing and gross spread), and foreign VC backing can potentially
explain why some Chinese technology firms prefer US exchanges over ChiNext as their IPO
location. We expect pre-IPO firm characteristics of the two group of firms to differ substan-
tially, especially in terms of size and profitability. In the next section, we test these hypotheses
after first describing the data.
3 Empirical tests
3.1 Data
The dataset contains Chinese firms that went public on ChiNext and those that conducted an
IPO in the US by issuing ADR shares between October 2009 (when ChiNext was launched)
and April 2012. The IPO data is obtained from the SDC database. The variables include
name, ticker, listing date, foundation date, offer price, number of primary shares, number of
secondary shares, number of shares outstanding before the IPO, gross proceeds, gross spread,
Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code, and a categorical macro-industry variable. We
use the data provided on the website of the SZSE to cross-check the listing date and offer
price of firms that went public on ChiNext. In cases of disagreement (three cases regarding
the listing date, and two cases regarding the offer price) we use the data provided by the
stock exchange. Similarly, the data provided on the website of NASDAQ is used to cross-
check the listing date and offer price of firms that went public in the US. We find no cases of
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disagreement.
Apart from the IPO data collected from the SDC, we obtain data on pre-IPO firm char-
acteristics, which is needed when testing the hypotheses discussed in Section 2. The data on
financials is obtained from Compustat for the US subsample and Datastream for the ChiNext
subsample.
The initial sample includes 376 firms, 311 of which went public on ChiNext and the
remaining 65 on NASDAQ or the NYSE. We classify an IPO firm as a technology firm if one
of the following two conditions hold: (1) the firm is identified as a technology firm according
to the criteria of Loughran and Ritter (2004); (2) the firm’s macro industry is high-technology
according to the SDC. Loughran and Ritter define technology firms as those that are operating
in one of the following industries (4-digit SIC codes in parentheses): computer hardware (3571,
3572, 3575, 3577, 3578), communications equipment (3661, 3663, 3669), electronics (3671,
3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679), navigation equipment (3812), measuring and controlling
devices (3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829), medical instruments (3841, 3845), telephone equipment
(4812, 4813), communications services (4899), and software (7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375,
7378, 7379). The macro industry variable provided by the SDC is based on a Thomson Reuters
proprietary classification scheme that uses SIC codes, North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS) codes and overall company business description.
We examine our initial sample of 376 firms and identify 150 technology firms, which con-
stitute our final sample. 128 firms in our final sample went public on ChiNext and 22 firms in
the US. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1. All of the 22 IPOs in the US subsample
and approximately 75% of the 128 IPOs in the ChiNext subsample took place between Jan-
uary 2010 and December 2011. Average proceeds are $134 million and $100 million for the US
and ChiNext subsamples respectively. Univariate analysis of pre-IPO profitability and size
provide the first evidence in support of hypotheses H3b and H3c respectively. A Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test rejects that the distribution of pre-IPO profitability is the same across
the US and ChiNext subsamples at the 1% significance level. Chinese technology firms that
are not profitable at the time when they desire an IPO prefer an issue in the US, since they
16
cannot list shares on ChiNext until they become profitable. Furthermore, the statistics in
Panel C suggest that among the Chinese firms that go public in the US, technology firms
are less profitable. This is consistent with our proposition that meeting the profitability re-
quirement is particularly challenging for technology firms and that ChiNext will miss out on
some technology IPOs as a result. Finally, in Panel D, we observe that Chinese technology
firms that go public on ChiNext are smaller compared to those that undertake an IPO in
either US exchange (a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test rejects equality of distributions at the
1% significance level), which is consistent with the prior literature. We investigate further the
significance of profitability and size as determinants of IPO location in a multivariate setting
in Section 3.4.1.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
3.2 Product market considerations of going public in the US
A frequently cited reason for listing shares abroad is that the issuing firm either has a strong
presence in foreign markets (especially in the country in which it chooses to list shares) and
benefits from its product market reputation, or aims to capitalize on the visibility brought by
the IPO to increase its foreign sales. Therefore, some of the Chinese technology firms might
prefer the US exchanges over ChiNext, because they either generate a large fraction of their
sales abroad (particularly in the US), or aim to increase the sales of their products or services
in foreign markets. In Section 2, these arguments are formalized as H1a and H1b and the
purpose of this subsection is to test these two hypotheses.
We manually collect data on the geographical breakdown of sales of sample firms that
conducted an IPO in the US from 20-F reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission. We denote the fiscal year in which the IPO took place as y = 0. Thereafter, y = 1
(y = −1) is the succeeding (preceding) fiscal year, and so on. The data spans up to three years
before and two years after the IPO. Using this data we calculate the percentage of domestic
sales. Some issuers do not report a breakdown when their operations are mainly domestic.
For instance, the 20-F report filed by Kingtone Wirelessinfo Solution Holding Ltd on January
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20, 2011 states (on page F-15) that: ‘as the Company’s long-lived assets are substantially all
located in the PRC and substantially all the Company’s revenues are derived from within the
PRC, no geographical segments are presented.’10 In these cases domestic sales are assumed
to represent 100% of total sales.
We also calculate a Herfindahl index (for each firm and year) to measure the geographic
concentration of sales. In particular, after expressing the sales figure from each country (or
region) as a fraction of total sales, we square the fractions and then sum them. This yields a
value between 0 and 1. Higher values indicate more concentration. If domestic sales account
for 100% of total sales, the index has a value equal to 1.
Table 2 presents the relevant statistics and significance tests. On average, domestic sales
account for no less than 80% of total sales in any of the years surrounding the IPO. The median
firm generates all of its sales domestically between y = −3 and y = 2. For the vast majority of
firms, domestic sales account for at least 50% of total sales. The average levels of Herfindahl
indices are quite high across the years, which indicates geographical concentration of sales.
This is not surprising given that for most firms the bulk of sales is generated domestically.
This provides evidence against H1a, since the typical Chinese technology firm that goes public
in the US has either little or no foreign sales at the time of its IPO.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
We also test for the significance of year-to-year changes in the percentage of domestic sales
and the Herfindahl index. The p-values of signed-rank tests indicate that the percentage of
domestic sales do not change significantly around the IPO year.11 Conversely, we observe a
drop in the Herfindahl index between y = −1 and y = 0 that is significant at the 5% level,
however the drop is too small to have any economic significance.
Finally, we define the domestic sales percentage of firm j in y = i as DSj(y = i) and
regress DSj(y = i) on DSj(y = −3), where i > −3:
DSj(y = i) = α+ βDSj(y = −3) + j i > −3 (1)
10PRC stands for the People’s Republic of China.
11We have also compared y = −3 with y = 1 and y = −1 with y = 1. The differences are still not significant.
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If going public in the US has no significant impact on the percentage of sales Chinese tech-
nology firms generate domestically, we would expect α = 0 and β = 1, such that the domestic
sales percentage three years before the IPO is a useful forecast of the domestic sales percent-
age in subsequent years.12 On the other hand, if Chinese technology firms are going public
in the US to increase their foreign sales, the joint hypothesis that α = 0 and β = 1 should be
rejected. The regression output in Panel B of Table 2 shows that the domestic sales percent-
age three years before the IPO is a significant determinant of the domestic sales percentage
up to two years after the IPO. Furthermore, in all five cases, we fail to reject that α = 0 and
β = 1. Therefore, domestic and foreign sales percentages remain more or less the same up to
three years after the IPO, which is evidence against H1b.
Taken together, the evidence presented in Table 2 suggests that the IPOs of Chinese
technology firms in the US (during the period when ChiNext has been active) are not driven
by product market considerations. Firms that prefer US exchanges mostly operate in China
where their long-lived assets are allocated. They do not experience an economically significant
shift in their foreign sales following their IPOs.
3.3 Costs of going public on ChiNext versus NASDAQ/NYSE
A stylized fact about IPO markets is that IPOs yield positive initial returns on average (see
e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 2004, Ritter and Welch, 2002 and Ibbotson et al., 1994 for the
US evidence, and Loughran et al., 1994 and Boulton et al., 2011 for international evidence).
Initial return is typically measured as the percentage change between the offer price and the
closing price on the first day of trading. In the US, the market return between the offering
and listing dates is close to zero. Consequently, initial returns are not adjusted. However,
there is a long time gap between the offering and listing dates in Chinese markets (the median
time gap is 14 calendar days in our sample of ChiNext IPOs). Therefore, papers that study
underpricing of Chinese IPOs normally adjust initial returns by subtracting the market return
between the offering and listing dates (see e.g., Chan et al., 2004). We follow this practice
12In essence, this is similar to a Mincer-Zarnowitz-type regression (Mincer and Zarnowitz, 1969) used in the
forecasting literature.
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and use the Shenzhen A-Share stock price index to estimate market returns.
High levels of initial returns is the norm rather than the exception for firms that go public
in China. Initial returns exceeding 50% are not uncommon. In our sample, about a quarter
of the 128 IPOs on ChiNext yielded an initial return of at least 50%. The average level of
initial returns is much lower in the US (17.9% between 1980 and 2012 according to the latest
statistics on Jay Ritter’s homepage). To the extent that initial returns proxy for underpricing,
which is an indirect cost of going public, Chinese firms will have a motivation to go public
in the US. Therefore, we investigate whether the sample firms that preferred an IPO on
NASDAQ or NYSE did so in order to avoid suffering from heavy underpricing.
We report underpricing levels of firms that went public on ChiNext and NASDAQ/NYSE
in Column (i) of Panel A in Table 3. Underpricing UP is defined as the initial return between
the IPO date and the listing date for the IPOs in the US subsample and as the initial return
between the IPO date and the listing date minus the market return over the same period
for the IPOs in the ChiNext subsample. Both mean and median underpricing are lower
for firms that go public in the US, and the difference in medians is statistically significant
at the 10% level. At first sight these figures seem to support H2a, such that a motivation
for Chinese technology firms to go public in the US rather on ChiNext is the prospect of
lower underpricing. However, such a comparison of means and medians ignores any likely
heterogeneity between the two subsamples.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
3.3.1 Propensity score matching
We address the issue of heterogeneity by matching firms that go public in the US with those
that conduct an IPO on ChiNext. In particular, we use the following variables representing
pre-IPO firm characteristics to estimate propensity scores: ln(Sales) (natural logarithm of
sales), Debt (long-term debt over total assets), Profit (profit margin i.e. net income over
sales), Intan (intangible assets over total assets), CapX (capital expenditure over total as-
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sets), and T/O (asset turnover i.e. sales over total assets).13 All variables are measured at the
end of the fiscal year before the IPO took place (i.e., y = −1). Sales is measured in millions
of US dollars. Debt, Profit, Intan, CapX, and T/O are reported in percentage points.
After estimating propensity scores, we employ a nearest neighbor (N.N.) matching algo-
rithm and match firms in the US subsample with firms that have the closest propensity score
in the ChiNext subsample. The statistics in Column (ii) of panel A in Table 3 indicate that
the statistically and economically significant gap in median underpricing observed in Column
(i) disappears after the N.N. matching. This suggests that H2a is no longer supported once the
heterogeneity between the firms in the US and ChiNext subsamples is accounted for. Thus,
Chinese technology firms that go public in the US are not less underpriced than comparable
firms that choose to go public on ChiNext. Lower underpricing does therefore not seem to be
the motivation for these firms to prefer a listing in the US.
We try alternative propensity score matching algorithms to test whether the findings based
on the N.N. matching are robust. We begin with caliper matching, such that a firm in the US
subsample is matched with up to five firms in the ChiNext subsample that have a propensity
score within a caliper of 0.01. Kernel matching is employed next. More specifically, an IPO in
the US subsample is matched with all IPOs in the ChiNext subsample, but control IPOs with
closer propensity scores are given higher weights.14 Radius matching is also used, such that
all IPOs in the ChiNext subsample that are within a caliper 0.01 are used as control IPOs.
Finally, we employ stratification matching with five strata. The sample is divided into five
blocks on the basis of propensity scores such that within each block the average propensity
score is similar between the US and ChiNext subsamples. The differences in underpricing
are measured within each block, and a weighted average of these differences is taken as the
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). Mean and median underpricing figures based
on caliper, kernel, and radius matching are reported in Panel A of Table 3 alongside N.N.
matching. The ATT estimate using stratification matching is 13.607. This suggests higher
13See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) for a discussion on how matching based on propensity scores can remove
bias due to observed covariates.
14We use an Epanechnikov kernel, but the results are not sensitive to this choice and remain the same if a
biweight, triweight, or Gaussian kernel is used.
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underpricing for the US subsample, but the estimate is not statistically significant (the t
value is 0.837). As a result, regardless of the propensity score matching algorithm used, there
is no significant difference in mean or median underpricing between the US and ChiNext
subsamples once we control for the differences in pre-IPO firm characteristics.
As a final robustness test, we focus on the subsample period between January 2010 and
December 2011, since there are no IPOs in the US subsample between October and December
2009 and between January 2012 and April 2012. The results are reported across Columns
(vi)-(x) of Panel A in Table 3. As before, the median underpricing is significantly lower in the
US subsample, but once we account for the heterogeneity between pre-IPO characteristics of
the US and ChiNext IPOs, no significant difference remains in mean or median underpricing.
Overall, the results presented in panel A do not support H2a.
Apart from underpricing, which is an indirect cost, there are direct costs of going public.
Lee et al. (1996) estimate that the direct costs average 11% of the proceeds in the US. The
largest component of the direct cost is gross spread. In the US, gross spread is exactly 7% for
most of the IPOs (Chen and Ritter, 2000, Abrahamson et al., 2011). Since ChiNext is a new
market, it is possible that underwriters charge higher fees to compensate themselves for the
risk of taking firms in a new market with no track record, or to exploit any bargaining power
they might have until the market becomes more competitive. Higher direct costs of going
public on ChiNext might induce Chinese technology firms to conduct an IPO in the US.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of gross spread for the firms in our sample. Not surpris-
ingly, gross spread is tightly centered at 7% for the firms that go public in the US, whereas
the distribution is dispersed for the IPOs on ChiNext. The mean and median of the two
distributions are compared in Panel B of Table 3. The figures indicate that the gross spread
is actually slightly higher for a firm that goes public in the US. Especially for the subsample
period between January 2010 and December 2011, the difference in means and the differ-
ence in medians are both statistically significant when kernel or radius matching is employed.
Therefore, a Chinese technology firm cannot expect to experience a lower gross spread by
going public in the US. This constitutes evidence against H2b.
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[Insert Figure 1 about here]
3.3.2 Endogenous treatment effects models
Propensity score matching techniques are very useful in eliminating potential biases caused
by heterogeneity in observable variables across the US and ChiNext subsamples. However, if
part of a firm’s quality is not observed and is causing a Chinese technology firm to go public
in the US and at the same affecting the underpricing of its shares, then there may be a hidden
bias in the results presented in Table 3.15
We investigate the robustness of the findings in Table 3 by estimating regression mod-
els that explicitly model a Chinese technology firm’s choice of going public in the US. In
particular, we regress underpricing or gross spread on its determinants and account for the
endogeneity of the choice of IPO location (NASDAQ/NYSE versus ChiNext). We follow
the approach taken in prior literature in choosing the determinants of underpricing or gross
spread.
The variables we use to explain underpricing UP are sales Sales, firm age Age (the
difference between the IPO year and the year the firm was founded), the ratio of retained
shares to the public float Overhang, market returns over the 30-day period before the IPO
Market (a value-weighted index of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks and Shenzhen A-
Share stock price index are used for the US and ChiNext subsamples respectively), and a
dummy variable US which is equal to one if a Chinese technology firm went public in the US.
UP is positively correlated with uncertainty and many papers (see e.g., Loughran and Ritter,
2004 and Lowry et al., 2010) use ln(Sales), ln(1+Age), or both as proxies for uncertainty such
that larger and older firms are expected to have lower levels of underpricing. While shares
sold in an IPO can be subject to underpricing, those retained by pre-IPO owners are not
(Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001, Bradley and Jordan, 2002). Therefore, a negative correlation is
expected between underpricing and Overhang. There is also evidence in prior literature that
underpricing is related to pre-IPO market conditions. Loughran and Ritter (2002) document
15Technically, there is no hidden bias when the assignment to treatment, which is going public in the US
in our context, is ignorable a` la Rubin (1978), given the pre-IPO firm characteristics used in our matching
models.
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a positive relationship between market movements in the three weeks before an IPO and
initial returns (see also Derrien and Kecske´s, 2007). Thus, we expect to observe a positive
relationship between Market and underpricing. As a result, our ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression model for underpricing is:
UPj = u0 + u1USj + u2ln(Sales)j + u3ln(1 +Age)j + u4Overhangj + u5Marketj + ej (2)
However, if unobserved factors that cause Chinese technology firms to go public in the US
simultaneously affect the underpricing of their IPO shares, US is an endogenous variable in
Equation (2). We account for this by running an endogenous treatment effects model.16 In
particular, we model a Chinese technology firm’s decision to go public in the US by using
covariates that are expected to explain this choice.17
USj =

1, if US∗j = w0 + w1 ln(Sales)j + w2Profitj + w3Debtj
+w4CapXj + w5Intanj + w5T/Oj + zj > 0
0, otherwise
(3)
where ej and zj are bivariate normal and their correlation coefficient is ρ (see Maddala, 1983
for further details). The endogenous treatment effects model is estimated using full maximum
likelihood. It is useful to test whether ρ = 0. If ρ 6= 0, then the error terms of Equations (2)
and (3) are correlated and correcting for the endogeneity of US in Equation (2) is necessary.
Our findings are presented in Panel A of Table 4. We report the results of OLS models
based on Equation (2) as well as endogenous treatment effects models based on Equations (2)
and (3) to allow for comparisons. Model (i) is the baseline OLS model. While all the firms in
our sample are technology firms, they still belong to different industries within the technology
16Derrien and Kecske´s (2007) use the same modeling framework when measuring how much an IPO’s un-
derpricing is affected by a firm’s decision to list shares before its IPO. Johan (2010) uses this approach when
investigating the relationship between underpricing and a firm’s decision to go public on a senior rather than
a junior market.
17This section focuses on the impact of IPO location on underpricing and gross spread. Therefore, we defer
the detailed discussion of how we choose the covariates that determine the IPO location until Section 3.4.1,
which investigates whether a Chinese technology firm’s choice of IPO location can be predicted on the basis
of its pre-IPO firm characteristics.
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sector and the level of underpricing can vary across industries. Therefore, Model (ii) adds
industry fixed effects using 3-digit SIC codes. Model (iii) adds year fixed effects to account
for the cyclical nature of IPO underpricing (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Finally, Model (iv)
focuses on the subsample period between January 2010 and December 2011. The coefficient
of US is negative, but not statistically significant across Models (i)-(iv). This finding remains
robust across Models (vi)-(viii), which are endogenous treatment effects models.18 There is
no evidence that Chinese technology firms are significantly less underpriced in the US.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
What remains to be done is to use OLS and endogenous treatment effects models to
investigate whether Chinese technology firms pay a lower Spread (gross spread as percentage
of gross proceeds) in the US. Prior literature (see e.g., Torstila, 2003) documents that a key
determinant of gross spread is the amount of proceeds raised in an IPO, such that there
are economies of scale in underwriting fees. Furthermore, James (1992) and Beatty and
Welch (1996) consider the reciprocal of the offer price OP as an explanatory variable, since it
proxies for risk that can impact gross spread.19 As a result, our ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression model for gross spread is:
Spreadj = s0 + s1USj + s2ln(Proceeds)j + s3(1/OPj) + vj (4)
We also consider an endogenous treatment effects model that takes into account the poten-
tial endogeneity of US in Equation (4). In particular, we model US in the same manner as in
Equation (3). Our findings are shown in Panel B of Table 4. Across both OLS models (Mod-
els (i)-(iv)) and endogenous treatment effects models (Models (v)-(viii)), the main variable of
interest US has a positive coefficient. In Models (v)-(viii), we observe that ρ is significantly
different from zero. This suggests that it is appropriate to correct for the endogeneity of US
in Equation (4). We observe that the coefficient of US is higher in Models (v)-(viii) in com-
18We fail to reject that ρ = 0 in Models (vi)-(viii), which provides no evidence that unobservable factors
that cause Chinese technology firms to go public in the US also affect the underpricing of their IPOs.
19For ChiNext IPOs, we obtain the offer price converted into US dollars from the SDC.
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parison with Models (i)-(iv). It is statistically significant at the 1% level in Models (v)-(vii)
and at the 5% level in Model (viii). These results imply that Chinese technology firms cannot
lower the gross spread of their IPOs by going public in the US. In fact, the evidence suggests
the opposite, such that firms that choose to go public on NASDAQ/NYSE bear a higher gross
spread.
In summary, the results presented in Table 4 are highly consistent with those in Table 3.
They give no indication that it is cheaper (in terms of issuing costs) for a Chinese technology
firm to go public in the US. These findings do not support H2a and H2b as the main reasons
why some Chinese technology firms prefer US exchanges over ChiNext for IPOs.
3.4 Foreign VC backing as a driver of going public outside China
The evidence provided so far in the paper suggests that product market considerations and
issuing costs (underpricing and underwriter fees) fail to explain why some Chinese technology
firms go public in the US, while others conduct IPOs on ChiNext. Section 2 offers several
reasons why the choice of IPO location might be primarily influenced by the presence of foreign
VC backing. This subsection investigates whether this is the case for Chinese technology firms
that went public in the US.
We examine the IPO prospectuses of the sample firms that went public in the US and
investigate whether they are backed by foreign VC firms. We find that 21 out of the 22
Chinese technology firms that went public in the US are backed by foreign VCs, and only a
single firm has no foreign VC backing. In total, 20 out of the 21 foreign VC-backed firms have
pre-IPO issues of (convertible) preferred stock, which is common in VC contracting (Kaplan
and Stro¨mberg, 2003). Table 5 provides statistics on the amount of proceeds the firms raise
in these issues. The figures are in millions of US dollars and include proceeds raised by the
exercise of warrants. The majority of firms have issues of Series A and B preferred stock, and
more than half have issues of Series C preferred stock as well. On average, the firms raise
about $78 million in total before going public in the US. The figure rises to $86 million if two
firms that did not issue preferred stock are excluded. This constitutes a significant amount of
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investment by foreign VC firms, which explains why a successful IPO exit is crucial for them.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
If a successful exit motivates the IPOs of Chinese technology firms in the US, it should be
common for these firms to offer shares owned by existing shareholders in their IPOs or follow-
up SEOs. The figures reported in Table 6 show that 14 out of 22 firms offered secondary
shares when they went public in the US. The secondary shares represented about 22% of
all shares offered. Furthermore, six firms filed for follow-up offerings within a year of going
public. The average time between the IPO and the filing for a follow-up offering was about
six months. All of the filings included secondary shares, which represented on average more
than 70% of all shares offered.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
We note that the figures in Table 6 are noisy estimates of the liquidation of ownership by
foreign VCs, since secondary shares can also be offered by other pre-IPO owners. Furthermore,
VCs can exit gradually over a longer term and via distributions to investors in the fund
(Gompers and Lerner, 1998). Nonetheless, the substantial amount of secondary shares offered
in both IPOs and follow-up SEOs underscores the fact that foreign VCs are, to some extent,
motivated by a successful exit when taking their firms public in the US.
The fact that Chinese technology firms in the US subsample are foreign VC backed does
not preclude the possibility that those in the ChiNext subsample are also mostly foreign VC
backed. If foreign VC backing is as common in the ChiNext subsample as it is in the US
subsample, then clearly foreign VC firms are not as particular about IPO location as argued
by H3a. To investigate this issue, we examine IPO prospectuses of firms that went public on
ChiNext and search for evidence of foreign VC funding. Both technology and non-technology
firms are included in our analysis to have a broader sense of VC exits on ChiNext. We
manually search prospectuses to find the pre-IPO ownership information of ChiNext IPOs
that took place between October 2009 and December 2010. A firm is considered as (foreign)
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VC funded if its pre-IPO owners include at least one (foreign) fund. A domestic (foreign)
fund raises all (part) of its capital from sources inside (outside) China.20
There are 163 IPOs during the period we examine, representing more than half of all
ChiNext IPOs in the sample (see Panel A in Table 1). We identify 133 funds, which exit
191 times in total via an IPO on ChiNext. Therefore, a fund exits on average 1.44 times
on ChiNext during a 15 month period. The median fund exits only once over the same
period. These figures are quite low and suggest that funds (both domestic and foreign) do not
frequently exit on ChiNext.21 Nevertheless, there are outliers, and six funds exit four or more
times, representing more than 20% of all exits. However, all of these funds are domestic.22 In
fact, we identify only seven funds as foreign, while the remaining 126 funds are domestic.
Table 7 provides further information about VC exits on ChiNext. Overall, more than 60%
of technology firms and approximately 55% of non-technology firms that go public on ChiNext
between October 2009 and December 2010 are backed by at least one fund. The number of
funds backing an IPO is typically low and almost three quarters of such IPOs are backed by
no more than two funds. Of the 163 ChiNext IPO firms we examine, less than 4% receive
backing from a foreign fund. Conditional on receiving backing from a fund, the percentage
of funds that are foreign VC backed is 6.38%. The figures are higher for technology firms,
but pale in comparison to the rate of foreign VC backing in the US subsample. As discussed
earlier in this subsection, 21 of the 22 Chinese technology firms in the US subsample are
foreign VC backed, whereas we closely examine 63 Chinese technology firms that are in the
ChiNext subsample and find that only four of them have foreign VC backing.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
20Funds are classified as domestic or foreign according to the following procedure. When we identify a fund
among the pre-IPO owners, we further search the IPO prospectus, since it contains some information about
the fund. If this information is insufficient to establish the fund’s sources of capital, we search for the fund’s
website and seek information there. If we still do not have enough information to make a decision, then we
search online directories that provide information about fund raising events and make a decision.
21In fact, the figures would be even lower if we could account for the VC funds that never had an exit on
ChiNext.
22They are, namely, China Science and Merchants Capital Management Co Ltd, Guosen Hongsheng Venture
Investment Co Ltd, Shenzhen Capital Group Co Ltd, Shenzhen CDF-Capital Co Ltd, Shenzhen Cowin Venture
Capital Investments Ltd, and Shenzhen Fortune Venture Capital Co Ltd
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Overall, the findings discussed here suggest that IPOs of foreign VC-backed Chinese tech-
nology firms are heavily clustered in the US. This is consistent with H3a, such that foreign
VC-backed Chinese technology firms tend to avoid an exit on ChiNext and prefer IPOs on
NASDAQ/NYSE. Given the strong evidence for H3a in this subsection and against H1a, H1b,
H2a, and H2b in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we conclude that foreign VC backing is a decisive factor
why some Chinese technology firms choose NASDAQ/NYSE as their IPO destination.
3.4.1 Predicting IPO location on the basis of pre-IPO firm characteristics
The findings in Section 3.4 that foreign VCs are reluctant to exit via an IPO on ChiNext imply
that foreign VCs may target entrepreneurial firms that have the potential to go public outside
China as argued by Zhang et al. (2007). In particular, we expect them to avoid small firms
that have no chance of undertaking an IPO on a US exchange. Furthermore, profitability
requirements for listing shares on ChiNext (while more relaxed compared to the SME board)
are still strict for technology firms. In the US, many such firms go public with the prospect
of profitability, but without being profitable at the time of their IPOs (Jain et al., 2008).
Consequently, we expect a significant difference in profitability in addition to size. Moreover,
if differences in listing and legal standards act as screening tools (Johan, 2010, Cumming and
Johan, 2013), then firms in the US and ChiNext subsamples may differ in other pre-IPO firm
characteristics that are informative about firm quality.
We compare pre-IPO characteristics of the firms in our US and ChiNext subsamples in
Panel A of Table 8. Variables are as defined in Section 3.3, with the exception of Assets (total
assets in millions of US dollars). As predicted, firms in the US subsample are much larger.
Specifically, they are almost three times larger in terms of Assets and two times larger in
terms of Sales. Additionally, there is a large difference in profit margins. In fact, the mean
value is negative for the US subsample. In general, the average profit margin is much higher in
the ChiNext subsample due to firms having negative profit margins in the US subsample. In
terms of other characteristics, the median long-term debt is close to zero in both subsamples,
however the mean is higher for the US subsample. The subsamples also differ in terms of
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asset turnover and capital expenditures, but not in terms of intangibility.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
Overall, the statistics in Panel A indicate that there is a marked heterogeneity between
pre-IPO characteristics of Chinese technology firms that went public in the US and those that
conducted an IPO on ChiNext. This implies a separating equilibrium in which a certain type
of Chinese technology firm is much more likely to go public in the US rather than on ChiNext.
To test this conjecture, we estimate the following logistic regression model:
Pr(US = 1) = F (β0 + β1Size+ β2Profit+ β3Debt+ β4CapX + β5Intan+ β6T/O) (5)
where US (originally defined in Section 3.3.2) is a binary variable equal to one if the IPO
was on NASDAQ/NYSE and 0 if it was on ChiNext, Size is equal to either ln(Sales) or
ln(Assets), and F (x) = ez/(1 + ez) is the cumulative logistic distribution. H3b and H3c
predict that β1 > 0 and β2 < 0 respectively. Specifically, larger Chinese technology firms are
more likely to go public in the US, but more profitable ones are more likely to go public on
ChiNext.
The regression output is presented in Panel B of Table 8. The results support H3b and
H3c, such that the coefficients of size and profitability are both significant and have signs as
expected. Furthermore, all models have considerable explanatory power with R-squared values
in the region of 0.5. Figure 2 plots Sensitivity (true positive rate) against 1 - Specificity
(false positive rate) for Models (i) and (iii) in Table 8. Sensitivity captures a model’s ability
to classify sample firms that went public in the US correctly, whereas 1 - Specificity measures
the model’s rate of error when it predicts that a sample firm is in the US subsample, while it
is in fact in the ChiNext subsample. The plots in Figure 2 suggest that both models achieve
a level of Sensitivity as high as about 0.9, with 1 - Specificity as low as almost 0.1. For
both models, the area under the receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve exceeds 0.9.23
23The area under the ROC curve has a minimum value of 0.5 when a model has no discriminating power. It
attains a maximum value of one when the model correctly identifies all true positives and negatives.
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Therefore, we conclude that these models may be useful in predicting a Chinese technology
firm’s IPO location based on its characteristics before going public.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Figure 3, which plots the distribution of the propensity scores for Models (i) and (iii)
in Table 8, provides further evidence regarding the major differences between the pre-IPO
characteristics of firms that went public in the US and those that went public on ChiNext.
The majority of firms that went public on ChiNext have very low propensity scores. In other
words, it is easy to predict their choice of IPO location based on their pre-IPO characteristics.
Moreover, approximately half of the firms that went public in the US are off the common
support, meaning there is no comparable firm in the ChiNext sample. This is consistent with
the idea of a separating equilibrium. Together with the results presented in Panel B of Table
8, the separation between the two groups of firms observed in Figure 3 imply that firms which
go public in the US are both much larger than their counterparts which go public on ChiNext
and also less likely to be profitable. These findings are consistent with H3b and H3c.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
4 Discussion and conclusion
Some Chinese technology firms choose to go public on NASDAQ or the NYSE, and not on
ChiNext, a domestic exchange that is designed to attract technology firms. Their choice
becomes puzzling given our findings that these firms mainly operate in China before and after
their IPOs, they do not experience lower underpricing by going public in the US, and they
pay a higher gross spread as a result of their choice.
The puzzle is resolved when we compare the pre-IPO ownership structure between the firms
that are in the US and ChiNext subsamples. VC backing is common in both subsamples,
but while all except one of the firms in the US subsample are backed by foreign VCs, the
rate of foreign VC backing is very low in the ChiNext subsample. Therefore, foreign VC
backing is a decisive factor behind the choice of IPO location. We also show that it is
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not difficult to predict a Chinese technology firm’s IPO location on the basis of its pre-
IPO characteristics. In particular, size and profitability are both significant determinants of
IPO location. Collectively, the findings imply a separating equilibrium such that small but
profitable Chinese technology firms tend to go public on ChiNext, while large and foreign
VC-backed ones tend to prefer an IPO in the US.
These findings have broader implications for entrepreneurial finance in China. Black
and Gilson (1998) argue that the VC industry of a country flourishes in the presence of
well functioning stock markets that provide VC firms with opportunities to exit successful
investments via IPOs. For many years, the development of the VC industry in China was
slowed by the near impossible task of taking entrepreneurial firms public on the main boards in
Shanghai and Shenzhen. The SME board launched in 2004 helped little in resolving this issue.
It was with high expectations that ChiNext, a NASDAQ-style board, commenced operations
in late 2009.
This paper provides the first evaluation of ChiNext’s potential to attract IPOs of Chinese
technology firms. It concludes that ChiNext has been only partially successful in its mission,
since it is not yet an attractive IPO location for entrepreneurial technology firms backed by
foreign VCs. There are clear policy implications that follow. There is currently a debate
in China about improving the transparency of the IPO approval system. In February 2012,
the CSRC published a full list of the 515 IPO applicants for the first time. Of these, 220
applicants were waiting to go public on ChiNext. There is an effort to move away from the
current ‘approval-based’ system to a ‘market-oriented’ and ‘disclosure-based’ system (see e.g.,
“In China, debate on IPO disclosure”, The Wall Street Journal Online, March 8, 2012). Our
findings imply that such a move could increase the number of technology firms that go public
on ChiNext. Foreign VC-backed technology firms that marginally prefer conducting IPOs in
the US may switch preferences and apply to go public on ChiNext, if they believe that under
the market-oriented system their applications will not be discriminated against in favor of
domestic VC-backed firms.
A further policy implication of our findings concerns market liquidity. We find that Chinese
32
technology firms that go public in the US tend to sell secondary shares in their IPOs and
follow-up SEOs. This may suggest that foreign VCs prefer conducting IPOs in the US so as
to exit their investments in a liquid market. Therefore, regulators can transform ChiNext
into a more attractive IPO location for foreign VCs by taking measures aimed at improving
liquidity.
We find that profitability is a key determinant of the IPO location. ChiNext requires is-
suers to be profitable at the time of their IPOs. This is a strict requirement for entrepreneurial
technology firms. Chinese technology firms can go public in the US before being profitable
and this in indeed the case for some of such firms in the sample. Foreign VCs may be reluctant
delay their exit until the firm becomes profitable and, thus, be deterred from going public on
ChiNext. As a result, relaxing the profitability requirement could be an incentive for foreign
VCs to pursue an IPO within China.
There are a number of directions for future research concerning the IPO location choice
of Chinese technology firms. In this paper, we do not compare the post-IPO performance
between the US and ChiNext subsamples. In order to evaluate post-IPO share and operating
performances, it would be ideal to have data for up to five years following the IPO. This data
has not yet become available, since many firms listed on ChiNext have been public less than
three years. It would be interesting to make this comparison when data becomes available,
since we could evaluate whether there is any difference in firm quality that is revealed ex post.
It would also be revealing to investigate the factors that determine whether an entrepreneurial
firm receives foreign, domestic, or no VC financing.
33
References
Abrahamson, M., T. Jenkinson and H. Jones (2011), ‘Why don’t U.S. issuers demand Euro-
pean fees for IPOs?’, The Journal of Finance, 66 (6), 2055–2082.
Bancel, F. and C. Mittoo (2001), ‘European managerial perceptions of the net benefits of
foreign stock listings’, European Financial Management, 7 (2), 213–236.
Bancel, F. and U. R. Mittoo (2013), ‘Survey evidence: what do we know about European and
US firms’ motivations for going public?’, in M. Levis and S. Vismara (eds.), ‘Handbook of
Research on IPOs’, Edward Elgar.
Beatty, R. P. and J. R. Ritter (1986), ‘Investment banking, reputation, and the underpricing
of initial public offerings’, Journal of Financial Economics, 15 (1-2), 213–232.
Beatty, R. P. and I. Welch (1996), ‘Issuer expenses and legal liability in initial public offerings’,
Journal of Law and Economics, 39 (2), 545–602.
Black, B. S. and R. J. Gilson (1998), ‘Venture capital and the structure of capital markets:
banks versus stock markets’, Journal of Financial Economics, 47 (3), 243 – 277.
Blass, A. and Y. Yafeh (2001), ‘Vagabond shoes longing to stray: Why foreign firms list in
the United States’, Journal of Banking & Finance, 25 (3), 555–572.
Boulton, T. J., S. B. Smart and C. J. Zutter (2011), ‘Earnings quality and international IPO
underpricing’, Accounting Review, 86 (2), 483–505.
Bradley, D. J. and B. D. Jordan (2002), ‘Partial adjustment to public information and IPO
underpricing’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 37, 595–616.
Bradley, D. J., B. D. Jordan, H.-C. Yi and I. C. Roten (2001), ‘Venture capital and IPO lockup
expiration: An empirical analysis’, The Journal of Financial Research, 24 (4), 465–492.
Bruner, R., S. Chaplinsky and L. Ramchand (2004), ‘US-Bound IPOs: Issue costs and selective
entry’, Financial Management, 33 (3), 39–60.
34
Bruton, G. D. and D. Ahlstrom (2003), ‘An institutional view of China’s venture capital
industry: Explaining the differences between China and the West’, Journal of Business
Venturing, 18 (2), 233–259.
Caglio, C., K. W. Hanley and J. Marietta-Westberg (2013), ‘Going public abroad’, Working
paper.
C¸elikyurt, U., M. Sevilir and A. Shivdasani (2010), ‘Going public to acquire? the acquisition
motive in IPOs’, Journal of Financial Economics, 96 (3), 345–363.
Chan, K., J. Wang and K. C. J. Wei (2004), ‘Underpricing and long-term performance of
IPOs in China’, Journal of Corporate Finance, 10 (3), 409–430.
Chemmanur, T. J. and P. Fulghieri (1999), ‘A theory of the going-public decision’, Review of
Financial Studies, 12 (2), 249–279.
—— (2006), ‘Competition and cooperation among exchanges: A theory of cross-listing and
endogenous listing standards’, Journal of Financial Economics, 82 (2), 455–489.
Chemmanur, T. J. and J. He (2011), ‘IPO waves, product market competition, and the going
public decision: Theory and evidence’, Journal of Financial Economics, 101 (2), 382–412.
Chen, H.-C. and J. R. Ritter (2000), ‘The seven percent solution’, The Journal of Finance,
55 (3), 1105–1131.
Cumming, D., G. Fleming and A. Schwienbacher (2006), ‘Legality and venture capital exits’,
Journal of Corporate Finance, 12 (2), 214–245.
Cumming, D. and S. Johan (2013), ‘Listing standards and fraud’, Managerial and Decision
Economics, 34 (7-8), 451–470.
Cumming, D., S. Johan and D. Li (2011), ‘Exchange trading rules and stock market liquidity’,
Journal of Financial Economics, 99 (3), 651–671.
Darrough, M. N., R. Huang and S. Zhao (2012), ‘The spillover effect of Chinese reverse merger
frauds: Chinese or reverse merger?’, Working paper.
35
Derrien, F. and A. Kecske´s (2007), ‘The initial public offerings of listed firms’, The Journal
of Finance, 62 (1), pp. 447–479.
Ejara, D. D. and C. Ghosh (2004), ‘Underpricing and aftermarket performance of American
depositary receipts (ADR) IPOs’, Journal of Banking & Finance, 28 (12), 3151–3186.
Gao, X., J. R. Ritter and Z. Zhu (forthcoming), ‘Where have all the IPOs gone?’, Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis.
Gompers, P. and J. Lerner (1998), ‘Venture capital distributions: Short-run and long-run
reactions’, The Journal of Finance, 53 (6), 2161–2183.
—— (2001), ‘The venture capital revolution’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15 (2),
145–168.
Habib, M. A. and A. P. Ljungqvist (2001), ‘Underpricing and entrepreneurial wealth losses in
IPOs: Theory and evidence’, The Review of Financial Studies, 14 (2), 433–458.
Humphery-Jenner, M. and J.-A. Suchard (2013a), ‘Foreign VCs and the internationalization
of entrepreneurial companies: Evidence from China’, Journal of International Business
Studies, 44 (6), 607–621.
—— (2013b), ‘Foreign VCs and venture success: Evidence from China’, Journal of Corporate
Finance, 21 (0), 16–35.
Hursti, J. and M. V. Maula (2007), ‘Acquiring financial resources from foreign equity capital
markets: An examination of factors influencing foreign initial public offerings’, Journal of
Business Venturing, 22 (6), 833–851.
Ibbotson, R. G., J. L. Sindelar and J. R. Ritter (1994), ‘The market’s problems with the
pricing of initial public offerings’, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 7 (1), 66–74.
Jain, B. A., N. Jayaraman and O. Kini (2008), ‘The path-to-profitability of internet IPO
firms’, Journal of Business Venturing, 23 (2), 165–194.
36
James, C. (1992), ‘Relationship-specific assets and the pricing of underwriter services’, The
Journal of Finance, 47 (5), 1865–1885.
Johan, S. A. (2010), ‘Listing standards as a signal of IPO preparedness and quality’, Inter-
national Review of Law and Economics, 30 (2), 128–144.
Kaplan, S. N. and P. Stro¨mberg (2003), ‘Financial contracting theory meets the real world:
An empirical analysis of venture capital contracts’, The Review of Economic Studies, 70 (2),
281–315.
Lee, I., S. Lochhead, J. Ritter and Z. Quanshui (1996), ‘The costs of raising capital’, The
Journal of Financial Research, 19 (1), 59–74.
Lin, Z. J. and Z. Tian (2012), ‘Accounting conservatism and IPO underpricing: China evi-
dence’, Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 21 (2), 127–144.
Ljungqvist, A. (2007), ‘IPO underpricing’, in B. Eckbo (ed.), ‘Handbook of Corporate Fi-
nance’, volume 1 of Handbooks in Finance, pages 375–422, North-Holland.
Loughran, T. and J. R. Ritter (2002), ‘Why don’t issuers get upset about leaving money on
the table in IPOs?’, The Review of Financial Studies, 15 (2), 413–443.
—— (2004), ‘Why has IPO underpricing changed over time?’, Financial Management, 33 (3),
5–37.
Loughran, T., J. R. Ritter and K. Rydqvist (1994), ‘Initial public offerings: International
insights’, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 2 (2-3), 165–199.
Lowry, M., M. S. Officer and G. W. Schwert (2010), ‘The variability of IPO initial returns’,
The Journal of Finance, 65 (2), 425–465.
Maddala, G. S. (1983), Limited-Dependent and Quantitative Variables in Econometrics, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K.
37
Mincer, J. A. and V. Zarnowitz (1969), ‘The evaluation of economic forecasts’, in J. A. Mincer
(ed.), ‘Economic Forecasts and Expectations’, New York: National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Mittoo, U. R. (1992), ‘Managerial perceptions of the net benefits of foreign listing: Canadian
evidence’, Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting, 4 (1), 40–62.
Pagano, M., F. Panetta and L. Zingales (1998), ‘Why do companies go public? An empirical
analysis’, The Journal of Finance, 53 (1), 27–64.
Pagano, M. and A. Ro¨ell (1998), ‘The choice of stock ownership structure: Agency costs,
monitoring, and the decision to go public.’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 187–225.
Pagano, M., A. A. Ro¨ell and J. Zechner (2002), ‘The geography of equity listing: Why do
companies list abroad?’, The Journal of Finance, 57 (6), 2651–2694.
Pa´stor, Lˇubosˇ., L. A. Taylor and P. Veronesi (2009), ‘Entrepreneurial learning, the IPO
decision, and the post-IPO drop in firm profitability’, Review of Financial Studies, 22 (8),
3005–3046.
Pa´stor, Lˇubosˇ. and P. Veronesi (2005), ‘Rational IPO waves’, The Journal of Finance, 60 (4),
1713–1757.
Ritter, J. R. and I. Welch (2002), ‘A review of IPO activity, pricing, and allocations’, The
Journal of Finance, 57 (4), 1795–1828.
Rosenbaum, P. R. and D. B. Rubin (1983), ‘The central role of the propensity score in
observational studies for causal effects’, Biometrika, 70 (1), 41–55.
Rubin, D. B. (1978), ‘Bayesian inference for causal effects: The role of randomization’, The
Annals of Statistics, 6 (1), 34–58.
Saudagaran, S. M. (1988), ‘An empirical study of selected factors influencing the decision to
list on foreign stock exchanges’, Journal of International Business Studies, 19 (1), 101–127.
38
Saudagaran, S. M. and G. C. Biddle (1995), ‘Foreign listing location: A study of MNCs
and stock exchanges in eight countries’, Journal of International Business Studies, 26 (2),
319–341.
Stulz, R. M. (2009), ‘Securities laws, disclosure, and national capital markets in the age of
financial globalization’, Journal of Accounting Research, 47 (2), 349–390.
Tan, Y., H. Huang and H. Lu (2013), ‘The effect of venture capital investment—Evidence from
China’s small and medium-sized enterprises board’, Journal of Small Business Management,
51 (1), 138–157.
Tian, L. (2011), ‘Regulatory underpricing: Determinants of Chinese extreme IPO returns’,
Journal of Empirical Finance, 18 (1), 78–90.
Torstila, S. (2003), ‘The clustering of IPO gross spreads: International evidence’, The Journal
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38 (3), 673–694.
White, S., J. Gao and W. Zhang (2005), ‘Financing new ventures in China: System an-
tecedents and institutionalization’, Research Policy, 34 (6), 894–913.
Zhang, W., J. Gao, S. White and P. Vega (2007), ‘Venture capital and the financing of China’s
new technology firms’, in C. A. McNally (ed.), ‘China’s Emergent Political Economy’,
Routledge.
Zingales, L. (1995), ‘Insider ownership and the decision to go public’, The Review of Economic
Studies, 62 (3), 425–448.
39
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
The sample includes Chinese firms that went public on ChiNext or NASDAQ/NYSE between October 2009 and
April 2012. A firm is classified as a technology firm if its SIC code is in the list used by Loughran and Ritter (2004)
to identify tech stocks, or it is classified as a high-technology firm by the SDC. Average gross proceeds are reported
in millions of US dollars. Pre-IPO profitability is net income as a percentage of sales in the final fiscal year before
the IPO. Pre-IPO size is total assets in millions of US dollars in the final fiscal year before the IPO.
Technology Non-technology All
ChiNext US ChiNext US ChiNext US
Panel A: Number of IPOs
Oct 2009 - Dec 2009 15 0 27 10 42 10
Jan 2010 - Dec 2010 46 15 75 25 121 40
Jan 2011 - Dec 2011 49 7 73 7 122 14
Jan 2012 - Apr 2012 18 0 8 1 26 1
Oct 2009 - Apr 2012 128 22 183 43 311 65
Panel B: Average gross proceeds
Oct 2009 - Dec 2009 98.19 - 79.45 75.06 86.14 75.06
Jan 2010 - Dec 2010 135.29 95.51 116.41 93.92 123.59 94.52
Jan 2011 - Dec 2011 80.98 216.89 97.22 59.55 90.70 138.22
Jan 2012 - Apr 2012 63.06 - 121.19 71.53 80.95 71.53
Oct 2009 - Apr 2012 100.00 134.13 103.51 83.42 102.06 100.58
Panel C: Pre-IPO profitability
minimum 4.11 -121.36 3.48 -53.62 3.48 -121.36
25th percentile 16.28 -42.22 12.73 5.50 13.89 3.38
median 22.97 8.80 16.33 15.33 18.57 13.56
75th percentile 31.52 15.39 22.15 23.40 26.75 22.58
maximum 58.14 47.13 58.34 59.51 58.34 59.51
Panel D: Pre-IPO size
minimum 10.49 17.91 10.23 8.77 10.23 8.77
25th percentile 27.00 60.27 31.96 44.69 29.30 48.40
median 38.83 105.06 45.81 69.97 42.62 83.75
75th percentile 57.48 154.49 68.20 148.55 62.03 154.49
maximum 279.70 523.92 457.70 727.38 457.70 727.38
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Table 2: Product market considerations of going public in the US
Domestic and foreign sales of the 22 Chinese technology firms that went public in the US between October 2009
and April 2012 are analyzed. The data is collected from the annual 20-F filings. The steps taken to calculate the
Herfindahl index for a firm in a particular year are as follows. First, the sales figure from each country (or region)
is expressed as a fraction of total sales. Then, the fractions are squared. Finally, the squared fractions are added to
obtain the Herfindahl index. y = 0 is the fiscal year in which the IPO took place. y = 1 (y = −1) is the succeeding
(preceding) fiscal year, and so on. Signed-ranked tests are conducted to investigate the significance of changes in the
percentage of domestic sales (or the Herfindahl index) from y = i− 1 to y = i. p-values of these tests are reported
in the table. In Panel B, domestic sales (%) in y = −1, where i > −3, is regressed on domestic sales (%) in y = −3.
The estimates for the intercept (α) and slope (β), and the p-value of the F-test α = 0 and β = 1 are reported.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels respectively.
y=-3 y=-2 y=-1 y=0 y=1 y=2
Panel A
Domestic sales (%)
mean 86.14 84.82 84.35 82.22 81.47 80.88
median 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
p-value 0.37 0.52 0.12 0.42 0.16
Herfindahl index
mean 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.81 0.81 0.82
median 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
p-value 0.47 0.97 0.03 0.52 0.03
Observations
Domestic sales≥50% 18 19 20 19 18 10
Domestic sales<50% 2 3 2 3 3 3
Total 20 22 22 22 21 13
Panel B
α -8.16 -4.09 -0.86 4.97 5.95
(9.44) (9.28) (6.56) (8.98) (12.68)
β 1.08*** 1.03*** 1.00*** 0.94*** 0.96***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.13)
p-value (α = 0 & β = 1) 0.47 0.81 0.85 0.77 0.35
Observations 20 20 20 19 12
R-squared 0.96 0.91 0.88 0.86 0.93
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Table 5: Pre-IPO financing of Chinese technology firms that went public in the US
Average proceeds (in millions of US dollars) raised from the pre-IPO issues of (convertible) preferred stock and
warrants is reported. The subsample includes 22 Chinese technology firms that went public in the US between
October 2009 and April 2012. The data is collected from IPO prospectuses. Occasionally, firms can issue Series A-1,
A-2 (or Series B-1, B-2) and so on. In such cases, figures are aggregated and reported as a single Series A (or B).
We calculate the averages in two different ways. The first assumes a firm raised zero dollars in all series subsequent
to its final issue. The second excludes such cases and calculates averages conditional on an issue.
Series A Series B Series C Series D Series E Series F Total
Missing series treated as zeros
Mean 17.19 16.35 13.74 24.56 4.09 2.27 78.20
Median 10.00 9.98 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 52.50
Count 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
Missing series excluded
Mean 18.90 23.98 25.20 135.06 45.03 50.00 86.02
Median 12.08 13.22 22.53 43.40 45.03 50.00 55.35
Count 20 15 12 4 2 1 20
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Table 6: Exit by pre-IPO owners of Chinese technology firms that went public in the US
Secondary shares as a percentage of total shares offered is reported. The subsample includes 22 Chinese technology
firms that went public in the US between October 2009 and April 2012. The data is collected from IPO and SEO
prospectuses. Follow-up SEOs include those filed within a year following the IPO. The last column reports the
average number of days between the listing date and the SEO filing date.
IPO Follow-up SEO
Count Secondary Count Secondary Days
Primary shares only 8 0.00% 3 51.78% 228.00
With secondary shares 14 22.26% 3 91.00% 123.00
All 22 14.16% 6 71.39% 175.50
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Table 7: VC backing of Chinese technology firms that went public on ChiNext
The sample includes 163 Chinese firms that went public on ChiNext between October 2009 and December 2010. A
firm is classified as a technology firm if its SIC code is in the list used by Loughran and Ritter (2004) to identify
tech stocks, or if it is classified as a high-technology firm by the SDC. A firm is considered to be (foreign) VC funded
if its pre-IPO owners include at least one (foreign) fund. A domestic (foreign) fund raises all (part) of its capital
from sources inside (outside) China. N is the count of observations. Percentage calculations are based on either the
number of all firms in the relevant category (columns titled ‘All’), or the number of VC-backed firms in the relevant
category (columns titled ‘VC backed’).
Technology Non-Technology All
VC VC VC
N All backed N All backed N All backed
Panel A: Presence of VC backing in ChiNext IPOs
Yes 38 62.30% 56 54.90% 94 57.67%
No 23 37.70% 46 45.10% 69 42.33%
All 61 100.00% 102 100.00% 163 100.00%
Panel B: Number of VCs backing a particular ChiNext IPO
4 or more 4 6.56% 10.53% 6 5.88% 10.71% 10 6.13% 10.64%
3 4 6.56% 10.53% 10 9.80% 17.86% 14 8.59% 14.89%
2 13 21.31% 34.21% 18 17.65% 32.14% 31 19.02% 32.98%
1 17 27.87% 44.74% 22 21.57% 39.29% 39 23.93% 41.49%
0 23 37.70% - 46 45.10% - 69 42.33% -
Panel C: The origin of the VC backing ChiNext IPOs
Domestic 34 55.74% 89.47% 54 52.94% 96.43% 88 53.99% 93.62%
Foreign 4 6.56% 10.53% 2 1.96% 3.57% 6 3.68% 6.38%
None 23 37.70% - 46 45.10% - 69 42.33% -
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Figure 1: The distribution of gross spread in ChiNext and NASDAQ/NYSE.
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Figure 2: Predictive power of logistic regression Models (i) and (iii) in Table 8.
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Figure 3: The distribution of propensity scores estimated using logistic regression Models (i)
and (iii) in Table 8.
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